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Interesse des Beklagten herbeigebracht wurde, den Inhalt des Gerichtsgutachtens zu erschüt-
tern. 
Entscheidend für den Ausgang des Rechtsstreit waren aber weniger die Gutachten und 
ihre Bewertung als vielmehr die im Gegensatz zum Verwaltungsgericht deutlich realistischere 
Einschätzung des Oberverwaltungsgerichts hinsichtlich der Konkretheit möglicher Konflikte 
infolge der Ausübung von Ritualgebeten in der Schule und den schulischen Möglichkeiten, 
den Konfliktsituationen und Gefährdungslagen hinreichend Rechnung zu tragen. Überzeu-
gend weist das Oberverwaltungsgericht auf die gesteigerte religiöse Empfänglichkeit und die 
verminderte religiöse Toleranz bei Jugendlichen hin, hält angesichts der vorgetragenen Kon-
fliktfälle in der Schule eine konkrete Gefahr für den Schulfrieden in einem Umfang und Aus-
maß für gegeben, der nicht mehr allein mit erzieherischen Mitteln begegnet werden kann, und 
sieht aufgrund der multikonfessionellen Schülerschaft keine hinreichenden Möglichkeiten, 
der Gefahr für den Schulfrieden durch rituelle Gebete des Klägers und zu erwartende weitere 
Antragsteller auch anderer Religionszugehörigkeit angemessen organisatorisch Rechnung zu 
tragen.
1.2.2. Ausland 
Supreme Constitutional Court Egypt: A Commented Translation of Egypt’s 
Supreme Constitutional Decision in Case No. 125 of Judicial Year 27 on 
Child Custody 
Von Andrea Büchler / Amira Latif / Firdavs Kutliev 
A. Introduction 
Over the past decades, family law in Egypt has been subjected to numerous reforms, which 
have strengthened the position of both women and children. These reforms include the raising 
of the age of children, for which divorced women are given custody. As a result, a divorced fa-
ther disputed the legality of the reforms by undertaking a constitutional lawsuit. He claimed 
that such reforms did not conform to Islamic law as required by Article 2 of the Egyptian Con-
stitution. The current article touches upon child custody in Egypt and discusses the relations-
hip of the state-enacted legislation and Islamic law by demonstrating the judicial review based 
on the principles of sharī‘a as interpreted by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) 
in Case no. 125. This case confirms the Court’s established practice and theory of interpreting 
the sharī‘a in favour of developing positive law and progressive jurisdiction. 
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I. Family Law in Egypt 
1. Sources and Reforms 
Family law in Egypt has traditionally adhered to Islamic religious norms to the greatest extent. 
These religious norms are mainly reflected in the areas dealing with marriage, divorce, main-
tenance, custody of children and succession.1 
In the beginning of the 20th century Egypt started to codify its laws according to We-
stern models, but family law has remained the domain of traditional Islamic law.2 Today fami-
ly law in Egypt is mainly based on Law no. 25 of 1920 concerning maintenance (nafaqa) and 
some provisions in personal status which encapsulates certain divorce rules, and Decree-Law 
no. 25 of 1929 concerning provisions in personal status which provides for the rules of divorce 
(talāq), maintenance (nafaqa), the waiting period (‘idda), and the dower (mahr). The mini-
mum age for marriage was fixed in Law no. 56 of 1929 and Decree-Law no. 78 of 1931. These 
laws primarily applied the tradition of the Hanafī school of law of the Sunnī branch of Islam.3 
In 1979 a short-lived presidential decree was issued as Law no. 44, which introduced 
some major amendments to the personal status law in Egypt. This ambitious law introduced, 
for example, such issues as the prohibition of polygynous marriages of husbands without the 
wife’s consent, the extension of the period that a mother was entitled to keep her children in 
her custody from seven to ten for boys, and from ten to twelve for girls as well as granting di-
vorced women with custody of children the right for the rented matrimonial home, etc.4 Ho-
wever, this law faced much opposition from the judiciary and religious circles and it was con-
sequently annulled on the ground that it had been enacted through an unconstitutional pro-
cess.5 The government of Husnī Mubarāk re-enacted some of its provisions as part of Law no. 
100 of 1985 on amending certain provisions of the personal status laws.6 Article 20 of this law 
provided that a divorced woman automatically received custody of her children till the age of 
                                                 
1  Cf. Chibli Mallat / Jane Connors (eds.), Islamic Family Law (London: Graham & Trotman Ltd., 2007) ‘Intro-
duction’, pp. 1-7; David Pearl / Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), p. 45. 
2  J.N.D. Anderson, Modern Trends in Islam: Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East, The Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly, 20/1: 1-21 (1971).  
3  In pre-modern Egypt the judges (qādis) would apply the relevant rules of the four Islamic legal schools ac-
cording to the mutual agreement of litigants. Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: 
The Incorporation of the Sharī‘a into Egyptian Constitutional Law (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 204.  
4  See Essam Fawzy, ‘Muslim personal status law in Egypt: the current situation and possibilities of reform 
through internal initiatives’ in Lynn Welchman (ed.), Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law: Perspectives 
on Reform (London/New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), p. 36. 
5  The 1979 amendments to the personal status law of 1929, also referred to as Jihān’s Law after the wife of 
President al-Sadat who allegedly took part in their drafting, were challenged before the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court (SCC) in 1982. In May 1985 they were found invalid due to undemocratic process prior to their 
adoption. The SCC stated that the law had been promulgated by presidential decree during a period of vaca-
tion when the People’s Assembly was not sitting, and had thereafter not been presented for approval when the 
parliament reconvened, cf. Fawzy, ‘Muslim personal status law in Egypt’, p. 38.  
6  See Kilian Bälz, ‘Die “Islamisierung” des Rechts in Ägypten und Libyen: Islamische Rechtsetzung im 
Nationalstaat’, RabelsZ, 62: 437-463 (1998), p. 457.  
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ten for boys and twelve for girls. The judge could also extend child custody by the divorced 
mother over her son till he reached the age of fifteen and over her daughter till she consumma-
ted a marriage. The judge would do so relying on the best interest of the child. 
There have been several reforms in Egyptian family law in the first decade of the 21st 
century. Law no. 1 of 2000 on the reorganisation of some provisions of personal status readju-
sted the legal relationship between the spouses, and included new provisions for women wil-
ling to file for a divorce. Law no. 10 of 2004 introduced specialised family courts and a judicial 
mediation provision. Law no. 4 of 2005 extended the rights of women with regard to child cu-
stody after divorce and raised the age of custody by a female custodian to fifteen years for male 
and female minors alike. In June 2008, after long and intensive debates, the Egyptian parlia-
ment adopted a whole package of measures to protect children and strengthen the status of 
women.7 Among these legal reforms is the raising of the marriage age to 18 years for both se-
xes, the recognition of rights for children born outside marriage or with an unknown father, 
and the protection of children from violence and discrimination. 
2. Child Custody According to Islamic Law 
A discussion of child custody, as conducted by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt in 
Case no. 125, requires an understanding of the provisions of Islamic law on this issue. The 
primary sources of Islamic law – Qur’ān and Sunna – contain no clear rules for the custody of 
children after the dissolution of marriage.  
Classical Islamic jurists traditionally distinguished between hadāna – custody in terms 
of satisfaction of basic needs which only mothers can provide or which are traditionally part of 
their responsibility, and wilāyat al-tarbiyya – a guardianship of education8, where the father 
would take the full custody of an older child from the mother and supervise his moral educati-
on.9 Hence, custody deals more with practical matters, such as care of the child and therefore 
the rights and obligations imposed on mothers and persons who might take their place, while 
guardianship centers on the legal rights and obligations of the child’s father and his represen-
tatives.10 So, the mother of the child, whether she is separated or living with her husband, has 
the first claim to custody of her infant. If the mother is unable or unwilling to take custody of 
                                                 
7  For a more extensive discussion of the 2008 reforms and children’s rights in Egypt, see Andrea Büchler, ‘Kin-
derrechte und Kindesschutz in Ägypten’, FamPra.ch, 4: 833-841 (2008).  
8  Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt, p. 203.  
9  Note that some authors have categorised guardianship of the child into three types:  
(1) the guardianship of education (wilāyat al-tarbiyya),  
(2) the guardianship of property (wilāya ‘alā al-mal), and  
(3) guardianship, known as hadāna, which concerns the women’s right for custody of an infant during the 
early years of life. Thereby, the two former categories are duties set upon the male parents.  
See Jamal J. Ahmad Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 158-159. 
Sarah Ganz, Das Tragen religiöser Symbole und Kleidung in der öffentlichen Schule in Deutschland, Frank-
reich und England, Berlin 2009, 104 für die Interpretation und Bewertung religiöser Vorschriften.“ 
10  David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law, p. 410. 
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the young child, the general principle is either that a close female relative of the mother, first of 
all the mother’s mother, takes charge, or this obligation passes to the child’s paternal female 
relatives, or to the father, who would then need to identify a suitable female carer for the 
child.11  
Guardianship (wilāya) is not only seen as a right, but also as a duty of the father, name-
ly the duty of maintenance and decision making on behalf of the child. Even during the period 
of custody of the child by the mother, the father is in charge of guardianship. The father is the 
natural guardian of his legitimate children.12 Guardianship, as opposed to custody, is given to 
the agnatic line. Guardianship may also be transferred by testament or through an appoint-
ment by a judge.13 
Whereas all schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree on the fact that the mother has the 
first claim of an infant, there is no consensus among them as to when the custody should be 
transferred from the mother to the father. The four Sunnī schools of law of Islam have distinct 
rules for hadāna. In the Hanafī school of law, the prevailing opinion is that the mother retains 
the right of custody until age seven for boys and age nine for girls (that is, until the age of dis-
cretion). Hanbalī law, on the other hand, comes to hold that a woman must be given custody 
of children of either sex until the age of seven, and the child is then given a choice between 
either parents. Shāfi‘ī law does not lay down fixed limits and on the attainment of discretion; 
both male and female children are given the choice as to whom they would prefer to stay with. 
The Mālikīs said that a divorced mother had the right to keep custody of a son until he reached 
puberty and of a daughter until she consummated her marriage.14 Consequently, the Shāfi‘ī 
and the Hanbalī school position reflect the ‘best interests of the child’ concept with regards to 
the child custody by giving a child the right of choice with whom to remain and by not setting 
any fixed age limit.15 Also, it can be noted that the Mālikī rule that a divorced woman could 
have the custody of her daughter until she consummated a marriage if the judge decides so is 
similar to the provision incorporated into Law no. 100 of 1985 in Egypt, as well as in the 2005 
amendments. 
 
11  Ibidem, p. 411. 
12  The differentiation between hadāna and wilāya focuses on legitimate children, as fathers traditionally have 
neither been attributed rights nor duties to their illegitimate children, i.e. children which are not born within a 
valid marriage. For the criteria of validity, cf. Mahdi Zahraa / Normi A. Malek, ‘The Concept of Custody in Is-
lamic Law’, Arab Law Quarterly, 13/2: 155-177 (1998), pp. 164-165. 
13  David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law, p. 426. 
14  Ibidem, p. 411. 
15  If the best interest conflicts with the child’s choice, the former however prevails, cf. Zahraa / Malek, ‘The Con-
cept of Custody in Islamic Law’, supra, footnote 12, p. 166. 
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II. Constitutional Law 
Egyptian constitutions adopted since 1923 have designated Islam as the official religion, with 
the exception of the interim Constitution of the United Arab Republic of 1958.16 Owing to the 
lack of legitimacy of the government, President Anwar al-Sadat made a decision in the begin-
ning of 1970s to favour Islamists as opposed to the traditional supporters from the left.17 As a 
result of this policy, the present Constitution was adopted on 11 September 1971, introducing 
the following provisions in its Article 2: “Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic is the official 
language; the principles of Islamic sharī‘a shall be a principal source of legislation.”18 On 22 
May 1980, the wording of Article 2 was amended following a popular referendum and the 
Constitution was changed to declare that the principles of sharī‘a are the principal source of 
legislation.  
Following this constitutional amendment a number of drafts of Islamic codes were deve-
loped by specially set parliamentary commissions. These drafts were reviewed and approved 
by the University of Al-Azhar. However, after the assassination of President al-Sadat in 1981 
and the transfer of power to Husnī Mubarāk, the government distanced itself from previous 
Islamisation policies and did not undertake any further attempts towards the Islamisation of 
law.19 Article 2 of the Constitution remained in place, but the Islamisation debate was sup-
pressed in parliament and the media. Some Islamist factions which were dissatisfied with the 
monopoly of the regime over the direction of Islamisation policies adopted violent means of 
confrontation with the new government.  
While Article 2 stresses the religious character of the state, the Constitution furthermore 
includes secular concepts which accommodate the promulgated patriotic and moral bases and 
values of the Egyptian society.20 The state shall ensure the protection of motherhood, child-
hood and youth. It is also obliged to ensure that women can reconcile their duties to their fa-
milies and their work in society, giving them rights equal to those of men, without prejudice to 
the precepts of sharī‘a.21 Article 40 of the Constitution guarantees equality of rights and obliga-
                                                 
16  The United Arab Republic was a short-lived union between Egypt and Syria which existed between 1959 and 
1961. See M. Martin and R.M. Masad, ‘Return to Islamic Legislation in Egypt’ in CEMAM Reports 1976 (Bei-
rut, 1978), pp. 47-78; Rudolph Peters, ‘Divine Law or Man-Made Law? Egypt and the Application of the 
Sharī‘a’, Arab Law Quarterly, 3/3: 231-253 (1988). 
17  For a historical analysis of the unpopular economic liberalisation programme and later suspension of state 
subsidies for food commodities introduced by Anwar al-Sādāt refer to P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern 
Egypt (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 424-438. 
18  Such provisions are also incorporated in the constitutional laws of a few states of the Arabian Peninsula, such 
as Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Similar requirements were also in-
cluded in the constitutional laws of the Republic of Sudan and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 
19  Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt, supra, footnote 8, pp. 196-200. 
20  Adel Omar Sherif, ‘Constitutional Law’ in Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron and Baudoin Dupret (eds.), Egypt and 
its Laws (London/The Hague/New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 320-321. 
21  Ibidem, pp. 320-321. 
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tions of all citizens without discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, language, religion or 
creed.  
The acting of the state legislator through an ‘incorporation’ of Islamic law in the order of 
the state law is restricted.22 As a result, it can be noted that although the laws are characterised 
by a constitutionally fixed link between classical Islamic law and state legislature, the practical 
significance of the constitutional conformity to Islamic law and its influence on the legislature 
process is overwhelmingly determined by the political environment. 
III. The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt 
All of the actions challenged on unconstitutionality grounds are reviewed by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt. Thus, legislations which are alleged not to conform to the 
provisions of Islamic law as entrenched in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, may be 
brought before the SCC. In a number of cases, including Case no. 125 which is discussed in this 
article, the SCC has acted as the sole authoritative body for the interpretation of Islamic law.  
The Egyptian judiciary system is characterised by the multiplicity of diverse bodies bea-
ring certain judicial powers. Ordinary courts with civil and criminal jurisdiction apply private 
law. Summary Courts (mahākim juz’iyya), Courts of the First Instance (mahākim ibtidā’iyya), 
the Courts of Appeal (mahākim isti’nāf) and the Courts of Cassation (mahākim naqd) make 
the hierarchical structure of these courts. Moreover, there are State Councils (also referred to 
as Administrative Courts) topped by the Supreme Administrative Court, which settle discipli-
nary cases in addition to the disputes between individuals and the administration applying 
public law in its competence.23  
The Supreme Constitutional Court tops both types of courts. It is the highest judiciary 
body in Egypt as provided by the 1971 Constitution. Law no. 48 of 1979 organises the status 
and competence of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Its competence is not confined to con-
ducting judicial reviews. It also interprets legal texts, settles cases requesting annulment of 
decisions in disputes with a government body, and decides over matters of conflict of jurisdic-
tion. The Court’s judicial review covers parliamentary laws, presidential decree-laws and ad-
ministrative regulations, and it does so to safeguard the standing of the Constitution.24 The 
effect of its decisions is far-reaching. The SCC is headed by a Chief of Justice appointed by the 
President of the Republic, and is made of two separate, yet interdependent judicial bodies: 
that of the Court itself, and that of the Commissioners’ Body.25 The Commissioners’ Body pre-
sents a report with factual details of the case, and proposals for the solving of the case to the 
                                                 
22  Bälz, ‘Die “Islamisierung” des Rechts in Ägypten und Libyen’, supra, footnote 6, p. 443. 
23  Cf. Sherif, ‘Constitutional Law’, supra, footnote 20, p. 319. 
24  Cf. Ibidem, pp. 326-327. 
25  Cf. Ibidem, pp. 327-328. 
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judges responsible for the final verdict. There is also a specialised organ with judicial power, 
namely the State Litigation Authority, which represents public interest in cases against the 
state. 
In cases where a legal matter concerns Article 2 of the Constitution, the Supreme Con-
stitutional Court has to examine whether the challenged legislation complies with the princi-
ples of Islamic sharī‘a or not. Since the 1990s the SCC has developed a systematic theory of 
Islamic law and it has applied this theory in a number of cases. 
IV. Translation of the SCC Case No. 125 of Judicial Year 2726 
1. Introductory Remarks 
Case no. 125 was published in the Egyptian Official Gazette no. 20 on 19 May 2008 in Arabic 
language. The plaintiff is a divorced father who is affected by the legal reform of 2005, which 
raised the age of the children for which women are given custody from the previously set ten 
for boys and twelve for girls to fifteen years for both sexes. At first instance, the plaintiff had 
won a case to take custody of his son. However, due the implementation of Law no. 4 of 2005 
the decision of the Summary Court was overturned by the Appeal Court. For this reason the 
plaintiff challenged the legal reform by filing a lawsuit against the government on the uncon-
stitutionality of the new wording of the law, claiming that did not comply with the provisions 
of Article 2 of the Constitution. Case no. 125 illustrates the progressive approach to Islamic law 
which the SCC has developed over the past fifteen years. 
While preparing the translation of the case we have broken long sentences into shorter 
ones in order to facilitate an easier reading without distorting the meaning conveyed. The lan-
guage of translation was kept as close as possible to the original. Where sentences sounded 
unclear, explanations were added either in brackets or in the footnotes. Wherever the SCC ap-
plied technical terms, the Arabic equivalents were put in parentheses. Lastly, the transliterati-
on of Arabic words follows the guidelines of Arab Law Quarterly.27 
2. Translated Text of the Judgment 
In the Name of the People 
The Supreme Constitutional Court 
In public session held on Sunday 4 May 2008,  
corresponding to 28 Rabī‘ al-Ākhar 1429 A.H. 
Under the presidency of Counsellor Māhir ‘Abd al-Wāhid, President of the Court, 
                                                 
26  Translated by Amira Latif. She is a scientific assistant at the chair of Private and Comparative Law (Prof. Dr. 
Andrea Büchler) at the Faculty of Law at the University of Zurich. Amira Latif earned an MSc in Geography 
and Islamic Studies from the University of Berne and is a BLaw candidate. 
27  Cf., in this context, also the editor’s guidlines as to „Transkription“ of the GAIR-Mitteilungen. 
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and  
with the membership of Counsellors: 
Māhir al-Buhayrī, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Abdallah, Māhir Sāmī Yūsuf, al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-
Mun‘im Hashīsh, Muhammad Khayrī Taha, and Sa‘īd Mar‘ī ‘Amr, 
and  
in the presence of  
Counsellor Dr. Hamdān Hasan Fahmī, President of the Commissioners’ Body, 
and  
in the presence of  
Mr. Nāsir Imām Muhammad Hasan, Secretary 
Issued the following judgement 
In the case recorded in the registry of the Supreme Constitutional Court as no. 125 of the con-
stitutional judicial year 27,  
Undertaken by 
Mr. Salāh Mustafā Hāfiz 
Against 
1. The President of the Republic 
2. The Prime Minister 
3. The President of the People’s Assembly 
4. The Minister of Justice 
5. Ms. ‘Azza Muhammad ‘Abd al-Samī‘ 
Procedures 
On 26 May 2005, the plaintiff filed the paper of this lawsuit with the registration office of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court requesting a ruling on the unconstitutionality of the text of Arti-
cle 20§1 of Law no. 25 of 1929, as amended by Law no. 100 of 1985 and Law no. 4 of 2005.  
The State Litigation Authority submitted a memorandum requesting to reject the case. 
After preparing the case, the Commissioners’ Body issued a report with its opinion. 
The case was examined as indicated in the minutes of the session. The Court decided to 
issue its ruling in its today’s session.  
The Court 
After examining the papers and deliberating. 
And whereas: The facts – as arising from the paper of the lawsuit and the other papers – are 
that the plaintiff filed Case no. 463 of 2003 with the Summary Court28 of Ashmun against the 
 
28  Note that Law no. 10 of 2004, which introduced new family courts, stipulates that all cases related to the fam-
ily law be handled in ‘first instance’ courts, as opposed to dividing such cases between ‘summary’ and ‘first in-
stance’ courts.  
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fifth defendant29 demanding a ruling to take his son in [his custody], due to his [son’s] reach-
ing the maximum age of the mother’s custody (hadāna). With its meeting on 16 February 
2004, the Court decided to accept his request. The defendant challenged this ruling by filing 
Appeal no. 427 of 2003 with the Court of Appeal of Shibīn al-Kūm. While the appeal was still 
under review, Law no. 4 of 2005 was adopted, which amended the text of Article 20§1 of De-
cree-Law no. 25 of 1929, as amended by Law no. 100 of 1985, thereby elevating the age of cus-
tody by a female custodian to fifteen years for male and female minors alike. The plaintiff 
pleaded for the unconstitutionality of that new wording. After the Court had approved the se-
riousness of the plea and had allowed him to file a constitutional lawsuit, the plaintiff filed the 
present lawsuit.  
And whereas: A direct personal interest is a precondition to accept a constitutional 
case. The crucial point [of the constitutional case] is that there should be a link between it [the 
personal interest], and the interest lodged in the substantive case so that the ruling in the con-
stitutional case becomes binding for the decision on the substantive case. Otherwise it [the 
constitutional case] would be dismissed. The challenged text became mandatory to apply to 
the substantive case. As a consequence, the transferential influence of the appeal [on the sub-
stantive case] has been activated. It [the appeal] leads to a renewed consideration of the mat-
ter by the Court so that it may give a word about it in the light of the challenged text which be-
came mandatory to apply on the day following its date of publication, on 7 March 2005. 
Therefore, the plaintiff has an interest in the challenge of unconstitutionality.  
And whereas: Article 20§1 of Decree-Law no. 25 of 1921 [sic], as amended by Law no. 4 
of 2005 states that “the women’s right of custody (hadānat al-nisā’) ends with a male or fe-
male minor reaching the age of fifteen, and the judge grants a male or a female minor after 
reaching this age a choice to remain in the hands of the female custodian (hādina) without a 
wage (ajr hadāna) until the minor boy reaches majority (sinn al-rushd) and the minor girl 
enters a marriage”. Since the substantive dispute concerns the right of custody (hadāna) over 
a male minor, the domain of the present case is limited to the application of the [challenged 
legislative] text on the male minor without embracing the female minor.  
And whereas: The plaintiff blames the challenged text for contradicting the rulings of 
the Islamic sharī‘a and therewith violating Article 2 of the Constitution, as it exaggerates in 
spoiling the minor without considering his benefit and what he needs for his formation. 
Thereby the right of fathers to exert their authority and guardianship (wilāya) over him [the 
minor] is discontinued. Furthermore, [the plaintiff alleges that] there is a violation of Article 9 
of the Constitution, which leads to a disruption and deterioration of the family by placing the 
 
29  Referring to the defendant parties listed above. 
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reins of the issue in the hands of the woman and the minor. In addition it contradicts the prin-
ciple of equality, because it excludes men in an authoritative fashion in favour of women.  
And whereas: Article 2 of the Constitution – since its amendment – determines that it 
is not permitted for a legislative text to contradict those rulings of Islamic law, which are abso-
lutely definite in terms of their immutability and their meaning (al-ahkām al-shar‘iyya al-
qat‘iyya fī thubūtihā wa dalālatihā). These rulings alone are those for which ijtihād30 is not 
permitted, as they represent the overall principles (al-mabādi’ al-kulliyya) of the Islamic 
sharī‘a and its immutable sources (usūlahā al-thābita), which accept neither interpretation 
nor alteration. Therefore it is inconceivable that their understanding would be subject to 
change with a change of time and place. Contrary to this [i.e. the rulings which are absolutely 
definite in terms of their immutability and their meaning], there exist rulings which are pre-
sumptive in terms of their immutability, their meaning or in both respects (al-ahkām al-
zanniyya sawā’ fī thubūtiha am dalālatiha am fihimā ma‘an). It is these rulings to which the 
scope of ijtihād is limited and beyond which it does not extend, as they change according to 
changes in time and place in order to guarantee their [own] flexibility and vitality. It is neces-
sary however, that this ijtihād takes place within the framework of overall roots (al-usūl al-
kulliyya) of the Islamic sharī‘a without extending beyond them. Thereby the realisation of the 
general goals of the sharī‘a (al-maqāsid al-‘āmma lil-sharī‘a), based on the preservation of 
religion, soul, mind, honour and property, is envisaged. If it can be said that ijtihād in pre-
sumptive rulings (al-ahkām al-zanniyya) is the right of experts of ijtihād (ahl al-ijtihād), it is 
more appropriate if this right is assigned to the ruler (walī al-amr)31 in order to resort to it [to 
ijtihād] in every question concerning them [the presumptive rulings] and suiting it [the ques-
tion] with [the help of] experts of logical reasoning (ahl al-nazar)32 in public matters. Any le-
gal regulation arising in such a frame does not bear in itself a protection against being abro-
gated or replaced with a new regulation, which albeit does not collide with any absolutely defi-
nite ruling of Islamic law. It [the new ruling] could be more merciful for the people (al-‘abād), 
better covering their matters, and better guaranteeing their interests. 
And whereas: Custody (hadāna) – in the origin of its legality – is a guardianship over 
the upbringing (wilāya lil-tarbiyya), the aim of which is to give attention to the minor, to se-
 
30  Ijtihād literally means “endeavour” or “exerting oneself”. In Islamic legal theory it denotes an endeavour of a 
jurist to formulate a rule of law on the basis of evidence (dalīl) found in the sources. Cf. Bernard Weiss, ‘Inter-
pretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 26/2 (1978), p. 
200. 
31  Walī al-amr, a commonly used term among classical jurists, literally means holder of power. 
32  The members of ahl al-nazar represent one of the positions of early Islamic epistemology. According to them, 
logical reasoning is the necessary and sufficient principle for the definition of practice, implying a disengage-
ment from the authoritative importance of Sunna, cf. Brannon M. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam. The 
Authorization and Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in Hanafī Scholarship (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), p. 73. 
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cure his care, and to deal with the matters concerning him in the first period of his life. Its 
source [that of hadāna] is the benefit (maslaha) of the minor. When the ruler (walī al-amr) 
decides over the limits of this benefit by defining its extent, it is because the Islamic sharī‘a in 
its overall principles – which are absolutely definite in terms of immutability and meaning – 
sets no limits for the age of hadāna that cannot be overlapped. Therefore, its extent shall be 
defined by what is necessary to safeguard the minor’s interest (maslaha) and avoid inflicting 
damage on him, considering that hadāna concerns the custodial child’s benefit (naf‘ al-
mahdūn) and that his care is prior to the interest of any other [party].  
While having differences on the hadāna period, the scholars (fuqahā’)33 indicated that 
the interest of the minor is the frame of their rulings. It [the hadāna period] is a matter of ijti-
hād, about which the opinions vary. As a consequence, the age [limit] of hadāna shall not be 
defined with a strict and solid regulation which does not take into consideration changes in 
time and place, but it requires a degree of flexibility which embraces its [the regulation’s] sec-
ondary rulings (al-ahkām al-far‘iyya) that are always responsive to development. It would be 
contradictory to this flexibility, if the legislator constricted himself to [the consideration of] 
certain opinions and would not deviate from them. Or, if he remained with his ijtihād in a cer-
tain point of time which the interests according to the sharī‘a already have exceeded. If the 
ruler (walī al-amr) has the responsibility for ijtihād in presumptive rulings, thereby consider-
ing the real interest, the proof for which is taken from the evidences of the sharī‘a, then the 
challenged legislative text is a mere definition of practical rulings within the scope of ijtihād. It 
[the challenged legislative text] aims to adjust the determination of the age at which the ha-
dāna of the minor ends, and to increase it to the age of fifteen years without differentiating 
between male and female minors as well as to leave the choice to the minor upon reaching this 
age. These [amendments] were dictated by the changes which took place in the society and the 
family, albeit without colliding with the immutable sources and the overall principles of the 
Islamic sharī‘a. It [the challenged legislative text] has not resulted from an authoritative view-
point, but it intends to remove uneasiness according to objective foundations, considering that 
the custodial child’s interest requires not terrifying him by tearing him out from his custodian 
(hādina), which would disturb his security and reassurance, and threaten his stability. 
Thereby social and cultural developments are taken into account and the scope of ijtihād is not 
abandoned, although he [the walī al-amr] may abandon it. [In addition] it is taken into con-
sideration that the minor can distinguish more at this age and that he is capable of assessing 
what is better for him. [Furthermore] it is established that the presence of the minor in the 
hands of his female custodian whether before or after reaching the compulsory age [limit] of 
 
33  It is unclear to the works of which classical or modern scholars the Court refers to.  
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hadāna – when he chooses to stay with her – does neither deter his father’s hands from him, 
nor does it restrict his guardianship (wilāya) according to the sharī‘a.  
The challenged text was issued in consideration of the overall goals of Islamic law and 
without contradicting its basic fundamentals, whether related to the determination of the age 
[limit] of hadāna or the necessity of the minor’s choice after reaching the age of fifteen. It [the 
challenged text] falls within its [the overall goals’] general directions recommending ijtihād for 
provisions, where there are no absolutely definite rulings in terms of immutability and mean-
ing. For these reasons, the claim of this [legislative] text’s violation of Article 2 of the Constitu-
tion has no ground. 
And whereas: The right for the formation of a family is not necessarily separated from 
the right to preserve it, so that the raising of children, their development, and the bearing of 
responsibility for their health, education and upbringing is guaranteed. The Constitution of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt stipulates in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 that the family is the basis of soci-
ety and that religion, morality and nationalism are its backbone. [It also stipulates] that the 
authentic nature of the Egyptian family – the values and traditions it represents – has to be 
protected, assured, and developed in the relations within the society, and that mother- and 
childhood are the basis for the formation of the family, the care of which is necessary for its 
progress. 
It is established that every legislative regulation does not bear a protection against be-
ing abrogated or replaced with a new regulation, which guarantees in its contents the real in-
terests, for the realisation of which the provisions should be legislated. The legislator’s author-
ity in the field of regulating the rights is discretionary in its origin. The essence of this discre-
tionary authority is represented in the legislator’s comparison of various options, in order to 
choose what he determines to be the most appropriate for the interest of the community, and 
most suitable to satisfy its requirements, thereby realising what he aims at by the regulation he 
is legislating. What he [the legislator] brought into the challenged text aims, according to his 
estimation, at the realisation of the legitimate interests of the custodial child by rising the age 
of hadāna and by leaving the choice to the minor upon reaching this age in accordance with 
the changes and the development which occurred to the conditions and the culture of society, 
without constricting the people or exhausting them. Therefore he [the legislator] – while ob-
serving the constitutional provisions in this regard – does not violate Article 9 of the Constitu-
tion, nor other texts which regulate the right of the formation and the preservation of the fam-
ily.  
And whereas: Every legislative regulation should originally contain a division or a dif-
ferentiation through sanctions which it assigns to some [persons], or through the advantages 
or rights that it exclusively guarantees to a [certain] group. However the crucial point of this 
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regulation’s constitutionality is such that its texts should not be separated from its objectives, 
so that there is a link between the intentions which he [the legislator] aimed to realise and to 
which he resorted in a logical [way] and not [in] a weak, imaginary or pretended manner, 
which would unsettle the basics on which the constitutionally justified differentiation is based.  
The challenged text – as previously explained – has realised what the legislator envis-
aged as more guaranteeing to realise the legitimate benefits which he intended to protect in 
the light of the goals of the sharī‘a. They concern the interest of the custodial child, and not of 
the male or female custodian. Thus, he [the legislator] has not adopted an authoritative privi-
lege to any of the two parties. In addition the difference between the consecutive [legal] texts 
regulating one topic is not to be considered as a violation of the principle of equality, but it is 
an expression of the change of motive over different periods of time. Retaining the minor in 
the hadāna of the mother does not prevent the father from exercising his right of guardianship 
(wilāya) according to Islamic law and does not limit it. For these reasons the text has not vio-
lated Article 40 of the Constitution.  
And whereas: The challenged text has not violated any other provisions of the Constitu-
tion.  
Due to these reasons 
The Court has judged to refuse the claim, to confiscate the bail, and to oblige the plain-
tiff to bear the costs and an amount of 200 EGP as a reimbursement to the advocacy. 
Secretary – President of the Court 
V. Analysis and Conclusion 
The Supreme Constitutional Court in its reasoning in Case no. 125 distinguishes the fact that 
the Egyptian legislature was not allowed to amend, change or re-interpret the rules of Islamic 
law that are of ‘absolute’ nature, while there also exist rules of ‘presumptive’ nature, which are 
subject to interpretation and alteration. Therefore, according to the SCC there should be two 
criteria which the state has to rely upon in lawmaking: the first is that legislation has to be 
consistent with the rules of Islamic sharī‘a that can universally be applied, and the second is 
the aim to promote the goals of sharī‘a. The Court having researched for clues in primary sour-
ces of Islamic sharī‘a establishes in its verdict that there are no ‘absolutely definite’ rules for 
child custody in both ‘immutability and meaning’ entrenched in them. Therefore, the Court 
then decides that the disputed matter is attributed to the second type of rulings where inde-
pendent reasoning (ijtihād) is allowed and the government (walī al-amr) is free to implement 
them, albeit not withholding the goals of sharī‘a the state must respect.  
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Such an approach to interpretation of Islamic law by the SCC has been seen by some 
scholars as an application of classical Islamic legal method or a portrayal of neo-Shāfi‘īsm.34 
Although, such an assertion might sound reasonable, it does not take into consideration the 
fact that there is also a slight deviation from the classical legal methodology in the SCC’s prac-
tice. Remarkably, when the SCC lists the five general goals of sharī‘a (al-maqāsid al-‘āmma lil-
sharī‘a), it seemingly applies the ones nearest to today’s reality through omitting the principle 
of lineage (nasab or nasl) in favour of honour (‘ird), which was mentioned by fewer Muslim 
legal scholars of the past.35 Some scholars have in fact raised doubts whether the SCC theory 
should be seen as Islamic legal methodology. They point out that the Court’s relying on the 
Islamic rhetoric and interpretation of Article 2 of the Constitution of Egypt represents a pecu-
liar way of protecting the autonomy of the secular legal order by gaining control over the au-
thoritative interpretation of Islamic law.36 Kilian Bälz, thus, emphasizes that the definition of 
ijtihād, in other words of the ‘independent reasoning’, according to the SCC is exclusively lim-
ited to the making of presumptive rulings out of the secondary sources of Islam, and does not 
extend to the interpretation of Qur’ān and Sunna. It rather explores the opinions of the classi-
cal jurists, as the corpus iuris of Islamic law.  
While the SCC appears constricted by the provisions of Islamic law in its rhetoric, it es-
sentially illustrates its unwillingness to abandon the right to determine the substance of these 
provisions. Owing to this strategy it allows the secular legal order to maintain its autonomy. In 
the conditions, where the members of Muslim Brotherhood have been increasingly extending 
their influence among the lawmakers and gaining seats in the Egyptian Parliament this might 
be considered to be necessary.  
Case no. 125 is a vivid example of this strategy used by the SCC to reconcile Islamic law 
with the secular legal order. The laws have a secular character, but are legitimised religiously 
in the public consciousness. In a number of cases the SCC attributed classical sharī‘a rulings to 
the ‘presumptive’ category in order to strengthen the SCC’s own progressive jurisprudence and 
to promote human or women’s rights.  
In its decision in Case no. 125 the SCC follows a well-established legal practice. It has 
employed similar methods in Case no. 7 of judicial year 8, which dealt with the raising of the 
 
34  Cf. Oussama Arabi, ‘Beyond Power: Neo-Shāfi'ism or the Islamic Constructive Metaphor in Egypt's High Con-
stitutional Court Policy’, Arab Law Quarterly, 17/4 (2002), pp. 323-354. 
35  On the history of the development of goals of sharī‘a see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Law and ethics in 
Islam: the role of the maqāsid’ in Kari Vogt / Lena Larsen / Christian Moe (eds.), New Directions in Islamic 
Thought: Exploring Reform and Muslim Tradition (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 26 ff. 
36  Kilian Bälz, ‘The Secular Reconstruction of Islamic law: The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court and the 
‘Battle over the Veil’ in State-Run Schools’ in: Baudoin Dupret / Maurits Berger / Laila al-Zwaini (eds.), Legal 
Pluralism in the Arab World (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 233. The author also discusses 
various academic approaches and existing theories suggested to explain the SCC approach to Islamic law and 
notes three principal theoretical models that have been developed to explain this phenomenon, which to an 
extent can be complimentary. 
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age of child custody and where the Court has decided it was not bound by the rules of the 
Hanafī school of law.37  
Last but not the least, the SCC’s method of interpreting Article 2, as demonstrated in 
Case no. 125, as well as past precedents of Article 2 jurisprudence, indicates that in certain 
conditions a court can practice a liberal approach to constitutional Islamisation. 
Federal Supreme Court Abu Dhabi vom 14.07.2010: VAE – Ein Rechts-
staat? 
Von Hilmar Krüger 
Der Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi bestätigte jüngst, dass der Attorney General selbst 
oder auf Grund eines Ersuchens des Justizministeriums das Recht hat, jedes – auch rechts-
kräftige – Urteil aufheben oder an das Gericht, das entschieden hat, zurückverweisen kann, 
wie sich aus einem Bericht der in Abu Dhabi erscheinenden Zeitung The National vom 14. Juli 
2010 ergibt. Das Justizministerium bzw. der Attorney General muss lediglich der Ansicht sein, 
dass das betreffende Urteil auf unrichtiger Rechtsanwendung beruht. Zwar kann weder das 
Justizministerium noch der Attorney General in der Sache selbst entscheiden, jedoch haben 
beide die Befugnis, jede Sache auf Antrag einer der beiden Streitparteien zu einer Neuver-
handlung an das betreffende Gericht zurückzuverweisen. Deren Intervention ist allerdings nur 
dann möglich, wenn in letzter Instanz rechtskräftig entschieden worden ist. Dies ist sowohl in 
Zivil- als auch in Strafsachen möglich, wie an zwei Beispielen berichtet wird. Ein kollisions-
rechtlicher Fall ist bisher noch nicht betroffen gewesen. Aber es ist sicher nicht auszuschlie-
ßen, dass dies auch in derartigen Urteilen vorkommen kann, wenn sich die im Rechtsstreit 
unterlegene Partei an das Justizministerium wendet. Nach Mitteilung des Judicial Inspection 
Department des Justizministeriums werden nämlich durchschnittlich rund 400 Fälle pro Jahr 
insbesondere wegen verfahrens- oder materiellrechtlicher Irrtümer sowie Fehlverhaltens der 
zuständigen Richter in dieser Form behandelt. Eine gesetzliche Grundlage hierfür ergibt sich 
weder aus der Verfassung noch der StPO oder der ZPO und wird in den VAE deshalb heftig 
kritisiert, weil hierdurch die Trennung der Zuständigkeiten der Exekutive und Judikative auf-
gehoben wird. Rechtssicherheit ist damit nur unzulänglich gewährleistet.  
 
37  Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt, supra, footnote 8, pp. 203-210.  
